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The Axelrod library is an open source Python package that allows for reproducible game theoretic research 
into the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. This area of research began in the 1980s but suffers from a lack of 
documentation and test code. The goal of the library is to provide such a resource, with facilities for the 
design of new strategies and interactions between them, as well as conducting tournaments and ecologi-
cal simulations for populations of strategies.
With a growing collection of 139 strategies, the library is a also a platform for an original tournament 
that, in itself, is of interest to the game theoretic community.
This paper describes the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Axelrod library and its development, and 
insights gained from some novel research.
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(1) Overview
Introduction
Several Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma tournaments have 
generated much interest; Axelrod’s original tournaments 
[2, 3], two 2004 anniversary tournaments [20], and the 
Stewart and Plotkin 2012 tournament [42], following 
the discovery of zero-determinant strategies. Subsequent 
research has spawned a number of papers (many of which 
are referenced throughout this paper), but rarely are the 
results repro ducible. Amongst well-known tournaments, 
in only one case is the full original source code available 
(Axelrod’s second tournament [3], in FORTRAN). In no 
cases is the available code well-documented, easily modi-
fiable, or released with significant test suites.
To complicate matters further, a new strategy is often 
studied in isolation with opponents chosen by the creator 
of that strategy. Often such strategies are not sufficiently 
described to enable reliable recreation (in the absence of 
source code), with [40] being a notable counter-example. 
In some cases, strategies are revised without updates to 
their names or published implementations [25, 26]. As 
such, the results cannot be reliably replicated and therefore 
have not met the basic scientific criterion of falsifiability.
This paper introduces a software package: the Axelrod-
Python library. The Axelrod-Python project has the follow-
ing stated goals:
• To enable the reproduction of Iterated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma research as easily as possible
• To produce the de-facto tool for any future Iterated 
Prisoner’s Dilemma re search
• To provide as simple a means as possible for anyone to 
define and contribute new and original Iterated Pris-
oner’s Dilemma strategies
The presented library is partly motivated by an ongoing 
discussion in the academic community about reproduc-
ible research [9, 16, 37, 38], and is:
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• Open: all code is released under an MIT license;
• Reproducible and well-tested: at the time of writ-
ing there is an excellent level of integrated tests 
with 99.73% coverage (including property based 
tests: [28])
• Well-documented: all features of the library are docu-
mented for ease of use and modification
• Extensive: 139 strategies are included, with infinitely-
many available in the case of parametrised strategies
• Extensible: easy to modify to include new strategies 
and to run new tourna ments
Review of the literature
As stated in [6]: “few works in social science have had the gen-
eral impact of [Axel rod’s study of the evolution of cooperation]”. 
In 1980, Axelrod wrote two papers: [2, 3] which describe a 
computer tournament that has been a major influence on 
sub sequent game theoretic work [5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 
18, 23, 24, 27, 32, 33, 34, 36, 41, 42]. As described in [6] this 
work has not only had impact in mathemat ics but has also 
led to insights in biology (for example in [41], a real tourna-
ment where Blue Jays are the participants is described) and 
in particular in the study of evolution.
The tournament is based on an iterated game (see [29] 
or similar for details) where two players repeatedly play 
the normal form game of (1) in full knowledge of each oth-
er’s playing history to date. An excellent description of the 
one shot game is given in [13] which is paraphrased below:
Two players must choose between Cooperate (C) and 
Defect (D):
• If both choose C, they receive a payoff of R (Reward);
• If both choose D, they receive a payoff of P (Punish-
ment);
• If one chooses C and the other D, the defector receives 
a payoff of T (Temptation) and the cooperator a payoff 
of S (Sucker).
and the following reward matrix results from the Cartesian 
product of two decision vectors 〈C, D〉,
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The game of (1) is called the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Specific 
numerical values of (R, S, T, P) = (3, 0, 5, 1) are often used in 
the literature [2, 3], although any sat isfying the conditions 
in 1 will yield similar results. Axelrod’s tournaments (and 
further implementations of these) are sometimes referred 
to as Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) tournaments. An 
incomplete representative overview of published tourna-
ments is given in Table 1.
In [32] a description is given of how incomplete infor-
mation can be used to enhance cooperation, in a similar 
approach to the proof of the Folk theorem for repeated 
games [29]. This aspect of incomplete information is also 
considered in [6, 24, 33] where “noisy” tournaments ran-
domly flip the choice made by a given strategy. In [34], 
incomplete information is considered in the sense of a 
probabilistic termination of each round of the tournament.
As mentioned before, IPD tournaments have been stud-
ied in an evolutionary con text: [12, 24, 36, 42] consider 
this in a traditional evolutionary game theory context.
These works investigate particular evolutionary con-
texts within which cooperation can evolve and persist. 
This can be in the context of direct interactions between 
strategies or population dynamics for populations of 
many players using a variety of strategies, which can lead 
to very different results. For example, in [24] a machine 
learning algorithm in a population context outperforms 
strategies described in [36] and [42] that are claimed to 
dominate any evolutionary opponent in head-to-head 
interactions.
Further to these evolutionary ideas, [8, 10] are examples 
of using machine learning techniques to evolve particu-
lar strategies. In [4], Axelrod describes how similar tech-
niques are used to genetically evolve a high performing 
strategy from a given set of strategies. Note that in his 
original work, Axelrod only used a base strategy set of 12 
strategies for this evolutionary study. This is noteworthy 
as the library now boasts over 139 strategies that are read-
ily available for a similar analysis.
Implementation and architecture
Description of the Axelrod Python package
The library is written in Python (http://www.
python.org/) which is a popular language in the aca-
demic community with libraries developed for a variety of 
uses including:
• Algorithmic Game Theory [30] (http://gambit.
sourceforge.net/).
• Astrophysics [1] (http://www.astropy.org/);
• Data manipulation [31] (http://pandas.
pydata.org/);
• Machine learning [35] (http://scikit-learn.
org/);
• Mathematics [43] (http://www.sagemath.
org/);
• Visualisation [17] (http://matplotlib.org/);
Furthermore, in [18] Python is described as an appropri-
ate language for the re production of Iterated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma tournaments due to its object oriented nature 
and readability.
The library itself is available at https://github.
com/Axelrod-Python/Axelrod.
This is a hosted git repository. Git is a version control 
system which is one of the recommended aspects of 
reproducible research [9, 38].
As stated in the Introduction, one of the main goals of 
the library is to allow for the easy contribution of strate-
gies. Doing this requires the writing of a simple Python 
class (which can inherit from other predefined classes). 
All components of the library are automatically tested 
using a combination of unit, property and integration 
tests. These tests are run as new features are added to the 
library to ensure compatibility (they are also run automat-
ically using travis-ci.org). When submitting a strat-
egy, a simple test is required which ensures the strategy 
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behaves as expected. Full contribution guidelines can be 
found in the documentation, which is also part of the 
library itself and is hosted using readthedocs.org. 
As an example, Figures 1 and 2 show the source code 
for the Grudger strategy as well as its corresponding test.
You can see an overview of the structure of the source 
code in Figure 3. This shows the parallel collection of 
strategies and their tests. Furthermore the underly-
ing engine for the library is a class for tournaments 
which lives in the tournament.py module. This class 
is responsible for coordinating the play of generated 
matches (from the match.py module). This genera-
tion of matches is the responsibility of a match generator 
class (in the match_generator.py module) which is 
designed in such a way as to be easily modifiable to create 
new types of tournaments. This is described further in a 
tutorial in the documentation which shows how to easily 
create a tournament where players only play each other 
with probability 0.5. This will be discussed further in the 
reuse section of this paper.
To date the library has had contributions from 26 con-
tributors from a variety of backgrounds which are not 
solely academic. These contributions have been mostly 
in terms of strategies. One strategy is the creation of an 
undergraduate mathematics student with little prior 
knowledge of programming. Multiple other strategies 
were written by a 15 year old secondary school stu-
dent. Both of these students are authors of this paper. 
As well as these strategy contributions, vital architec-
tural improvements to the library itself have also been 
contributed.
(2) Availability
Operating system
The Axelrod library runs on all major operating systems: 
Linux, Mac OS X and Windows.
Year Reference Number of Strategies Type Source Code
1979 [2] 13 Standard Not immediately available
1979 [3] 64 Standard Available in FORTRAN
1991 [6] 13 Noisy Not immediately available
2002 [41] 16 Wildlife Not a computer based tournament
2005 [20] 223 Varied Not available
2012 [42] 13 Standard Not fully available
Table 1: An overview of a selection of published tournaments. Not all tournaments were ‘standard’ round robins; for 
more details see the indicated references.
Figure 1: Source code for the Grudger strategy.
class Grudger(Player):
"""A player starts by cooperating however will defect if
at any point the opponent has defected."""
name = ’Grudger’
classifier = {
’memory_depth’: float(’inf’), # Long memory
’stochastic’: False,
’inspects_source’: False,
’manipulates_source’: False,
’manipulates_state’: False
}
def strategy(self, opponent):
"""Begins by playing C, then plays D for the remaining
rounds if the opponent ever plays D."""
if opponent.defections:
return D
return C
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Figure 2: Test code for the Grudger strategy.
class TestGrudger(TestPlayer):
name = "Grudger"
player = axelrod.Grudger
expected_classifier = {
’memory_depth’: float(’inf’), # Long memory
’stochastic’: False,
’inspects_source’: False,
’manipulates_source’: False,
’manipulates_state’: False
}
def test_initial_strategy(self):
"""
Starts by cooperating
"""
self.first_play_test(C)
def test_strategy(self):
"""
If opponent defects at any point then the player will defect forever
"""
self.responses_test([C, D, D, D], [C, C, C, C], [C])
self.responses_test([C, C, D, D, D], [C, D, C, C, C], [D])
Figure 3: An overview of the source code.
tournament.py player.py strategies/
Cooperator.py Defector.py
TitForTat.py
......
tests/unit/
TestCoop... TestDef...
TestTitFor...
...
travis.ci
doc/
readthedocs.org
match.py
match_generatory.py
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Programming language
The library is continuously tested for compatibility with 
Python 2.7 and the two most recent python 3 releases.
Additional system requirements
There are no specific additional system requirements.
Support
Support is readily available in multiple forms:
• An online chat channel: https://gitter.im/
Axelrod-Python/Axelrod.
• An email group: https://groups.google.
com/forum/#!topic/axelrod-python.
Dependencies
The following Python libraries are required dependencies:
List of contributors
The names of all the contributors are not known: as these 
were mainly done through Github and some have not 
provided their name or responded to a request for further 
details. Here is an incomplete list:
Software location
Archive
Name: Zenodo
Persistent identifier: 10.5281/zenodo.55509
Licence: MIT
Publisher: Vincent Knight
Version published: Axelrod: 1.2.0
Date published: 2016-06-13
Code repository
Name: Github
Identifier: https://github.com/
Axelrod-Python/Axelrod
Licence: MIT
Date published: 2015-02-16
Reuse potential
The Axelrod library has been designed with sustain-
able software practices in mind. There is an extensive 
documentation suite: axelrod.readthedocs.
org/en/latest/. Furthermore, there is a grow-
ing set of example Jupyter notebooks available here: 
https://github.com/Axelrod-Python/
Axelrod-notebooks.
The availability of a large number of strategies makes 
this tool an excellent and obvious example of the benefits 
of open research which should positively impact the game 
theory community. This is evidently true already as the 
library has been used to study and create interesting and 
powerful new strategies.
Installation of the library is straightforward via stand-
ard python installation repositories (https://pypi.
python.org/pypi). The package name is axelrod 
and can thus be installed by calling: pip install 
 axelrod on all major operating systems (Windows, OS 
X and Linux).
Figure 4 shows a very simple example of using the 
library to create a basic tournament giving the graphical 
output shown in Figure 5.
New strategies, tournaments and implications
Due to the open nature of the library the number of strat-
egies included has grown at a fast pace, as can be seen in 
Figure 6.
Nevertheless, due to previous research being done in an 
irreproducible manner with, for example, no source code 
and/or vaguely described strategies, not all previous tour-
naments can yet be reproduced. In fact, some of the early 
tournaments might be impossible to reproduce as the 
source code is apparently forever lost. This library aims to 
ensure reproducibility in the future.
One tournament that is possible to reproduce is that of 
[42]. The strategies used in that tournament are the following:
This can be reproduced as shown in Figure 8, which gives the 
plot of Figure 7. Note that slight differences with the results 
of [42] are due to stochastic behaviour of some strategies.
In parallel to the Python library, a tournament is being 
kept up to date that pits all available strategies against 
each other. Figure 9 shows the results from the full 
tour nament which can also be seen (in full detail) here: 
http://axelrod-tournament.readthedocs.
org/. Data sets are also available showing the plays of 
every match that takes place. Note that to recreate this 
• Numpy 1.9.2 • Tqdm 3.4.0
• Matplotlib 1.4.2 (only a 
requirement if graphi-
cal output is required)
•  Hypothesis 3.0 (only 
a requirement for 
development)
• Owen Campbell • Alex Carney
• Marc Harper • Martin Chorley
• Vincent Knight • Cameron Davidson-
Pilon
• Karol M. Langner • Kristian Glass
• James Campbell • Nikoleta Glynatsi
• Thomas Campbell • Tomáš Ehrlich
• Martin Jones • Timothy Standen
• Georgios Koutsovoulos • Luis Visintini
• Holly Tibble • Karl Molden
•  Jochen Müller • Jason Young
• Geraint Palmer • Andy Boot
• Paul Slavin • Anna Barriscale
01. Cooperator 11. Random: 0.5
02. Defector 12. ZD-GTFT-2
03. ZD-Extort-2 13. GTFT: 0.33
04. Joss: 0.9 14. Hard Prober
05. Hard Tit For Tat 15. Prober
06. Hard Tit For 2 Tats 16. Prober 2
07. Tit For Tat 17. Prober 3
08. Grudger 18. Calculator
09. Tit For 2 Tats 19. Hard Go By Majority
10. Win-Stay Lose-Shift
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tournament simply requires changing a single line of the 
code shown in Figure 4, changing:
>>> strategies = [s() for s in axelrod.
demo_strategies]}
to:
>>> strategies = [s() for s in axelrod.
ordinary_strategies]}.
The current winning strategy is new to the research litera-
ture: Looker Up. This is a strategy that maps a given set of 
states to actions. The state space is defined generically by m, 
n so as to map states to actions as shown in (2).
last pairs of actions
first actions by opponent
(( , , , , , , , ) (( , ),, )( , ))
n
m
C D D D C D D C C C C C D®


  
(2)
The example of (2) is an incomplete illustration of the map-
ping for m = 8, n = 2. Intuitively, this state space uses the 
initial plays of the opponent to gain some information 
about its intentions whilst still taking into account the 
recent play. The actual winning strategy is an instance of 
the framework for m = n = 2 for which a particle swarm 
algorithm has been used to train it. The second placed strat-
egy was trained with an evolutionary algorithm [19]. In [21] 
experiments are described that evaluate how the second 
placed strategy behaves in environments other than those 
in which it was trained and it continues to perform strongly.
There are various other insights that have been gained 
from ongoing open research on the library, details can be 
found in [14]. These include:
• A closer look at zero determinant strategies, showing 
that extortionate strate gies obtain a large number of 
wins: the number of times they outscore an opponent 
during a given match. However these do not perform 
particularly well from the overall tournament ranking 
point of view. This is relevant given the findings of 
[42] in which zero determinant strategies are shown 
to be able to perform better than any other strategy. 
This finding extends to noisy tournaments (which are 
also implemented in the library).
Figure 4: A simple set of commands to create a demonstration tournament. The output is shown in Figure 5.
>>> import axelrod
>>> strategies = [s() for s in axelrod.demo_strategies]
>>> tournament = axelrod.Tournament(strategies)
>>> results = tournament.play()
>>> plot = axelrod.Plot(results)
>>> p = plot.boxplot()
>>> p.show()
Figure 5: The results from a simple tournament.
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• This negative relationship between wins and perfor-
mance does not generalise. There are some strategies 
that perform well, both in terms of matches won and 
overall performance: Back stabber, Double crosser, 
Looker Up, and Fool Me Once. These strategies con-
tinue to perform well in noisy tournaments, however 
Figure 6: The number of strategies included in the library.
Figure 7: The results from [42], reproduced with the Axelrod library.
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some of these have knowledge of the length of the 
game (Back stabber and Double crosser). This is not 
necessary to rank well in both wins and score as dem-
onstrated by Looker Up and Fool Me Once.
• Strategies like Looker Up and Meta Hunter seem to 
be generally cooperative yet still exploit naive strate-
gies. The Meta Hunter strategy is a particular type of 
Meta strategy which uses a variety of other strategy 
behaviours to choose a best action. These strategies 
perform very well in general and continue to do so in 
noisy tournaments.
Conclusion
This paper has presented a game theoretic software pack-
age that aims to address reproducibility of research into 
the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. The open nature of the 
development of the library has lead rapidly to the inclu-
sion of many well known strategies, many novel strate-
gies, and new and recapitulated insights.
The capabilities of the library mentioned above are not 
at all comprehensive, a list of the current abilities include:
• Noisy tournaments.
• Tournaments with probabilistic ending of interactions.
• Ecological analysis of tournaments.
• Moran processes.
• Morality metrics based on [39].
• Transformation of strategies (in effect giving an infi-
nite number of strategies).
• Classification of strategies according to multiple 
dimensions.
• Gathering of full interaction history for all interac-
tions.
• Parallelization of computations for tournaments with 
a high computational cost.
These capabilities are constantly being updated.
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